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Abstract
The role of distinct currencies is studied using a random-matching model
with randomized trades. The equilibrium concept is the pairwise core in
meetings. We show that there exist equilibria in which home and foreign
currency play distinct roles and in which the quantities of trade and output
are less than the optimal quantities. The benefit of a uniform currency is
the elimination of such inferior equilibria. Specifically, any equilibrium in
which home and foreign currency play distinct roles is dominated in terms of
ex ante welfare by the best one-currency equilibrium — for some parameters
weakly, for some strongly.
JEL classifications: E42, F33.
1 Introduction
There is a widespread belief that gains are achieved when a country or a
group of countries operates under a uniform currency–as the EMU now
does. An objective of the US National Banking System, established in 1863,
was the creation of a uniform currency for the entire country (see Friedman
and Schwartz [7]). And underlying the notion of optimum currency areas
(see Mundell [15]) is the belief that a uniform currency for the entire world
would be best were there no nominal rigidities. However, nominal rigidities
aside, neither Mundell nor anyone else has presented a model of the gains.
In this paper we do so.
Our model, a pairwise matching model, is a simple depiction of the long-
held notion that trading opportunities arise in pairwise meetings in which
there are absence-of-double-coincidence diﬃculties. The benefit of a uni-
form currency in our model is that it eliminates some inferior equilibria.
They are ones in which the currencies play distinct roles and in which, as
a consequence, the quantities of trade and output are less than the optimal
quantities. Among them are equilibria in which observed prices, calculated
from the trades that occur, are higher in terms of foreign currency than in
terms of home currency. This last feature is consistent with the distinct roles
of diﬀerent currencies that we often see, and, in particular, with the advice
that appears in many travel guides: if you pay in foreign currency, then you
get a bad deal.
We are not the first to apply matching models to multiple currencies
and countries. Moreover, some previous versions display a closely related
multiplicity of equilibria. In the two-country, two-money matching models
of Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui [13], Trejos and Wright [16], and Zhou
[18], there exists an equilibrium in which people do not distinguish between
home and foreign money. And if the potential gains from international trade
are suﬃciently small, then there exists another inferior equilibrium in which
they are distinguished. Even aside from the qualification about potential
gains from international trade, a qualification we do not need, there is at least
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one concern about those results: the existence of the equilibrium in which
currencies are distinguished seems to depend on extraneous assumptions that
rule out small trades.
In [13], [16], and [18], money is indivisible, individual holdings of money
are bounded at one unit, and trades are deterministic. In [13] and [16], a
country is defined by a pairwise meeting pattern: meetings between people
from the same country occur more frequently than meetings between peo-
ple from diﬀerent countries. There the equilibrium in which currencies are
distinguished has no foreign trade and has no one accepting foreign money.
A deterministic deviation from this outcome would have to have a producer
accept foreign money in exchange for production. In [13], goods are also
indivisible so that the producer would experience as much disutility as he
would to obtain a unit of home money. But if he accepts the foreign money,
then, given the strategies of others, he has to wait to meet a foreigner in
order to pass it on. Therefore, if such meetings are rare enough, then there
would be no deviation from such non acceptance, even cooperatively by the
pair in the meeting. In [16] goods are divisible so that the producer would be
willing to produce a small amount to get the unit of foreign money. However,
the consumer would not surrender the (entire) unit of his home money for
too small an amount of production. So again, there is no defection. In [18],
a country is defined by a distribution of taste shocks: people in a country
are more likely to receive shocks which make them prefer only home goods
than they are to receive shocks which make them prefer only foreign goods.
There, too, there is a no-trade aspect to equilibria in which the currencies
are distinguished: producers with a current preference for home goods do not
accept the foreign currency, a non-acceptance which again seems to depend
on the impossibility of small trades.
Therefore, the inferior equilibria in [13], [16], and [18] rest on shaky
ground.1 And if the inferior equilibria do not exist, then those models do not
1The model in Kocherlakota and Krueger [11] shares features with [13], [16], and [18],
but has a very diﬀerent message. They provide a model in which distinct monies are
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display a benefit of uniform currency. In this paper, we work with the model
in [13], except that we assume divisible goods as in [16]. And, although we
maintain the assumption of indivisible money and a unit upper bound on
individual holdings, we permit randomization as in Berentsen, Molico, and
Wright [4] so that goods can be traded for a probability of receiving money.
Such randomization in meetings permits small trades to occur–a small trade
being one in which a small amount of production trades for a low probability
of receiving the indivisible unit of money. In that respect and in others, our
model is formulated so that the main results stand a good chance of holding
in versions with divisible money.
We define an outcome to be an equilibrium if the trades in meetings satisfy
two conditions: the trades are individually rational and pairwise eﬃcient
given the future values of the two monies. In other words, an outcome is
an equilibrium if it is in the pairwise core in each meeting. This concept
of equilibrium is natural in a model in which trade occurs in momentary
meetings between two strangers against the background of a world populated
by a large number of strangers. It does, however, give rise to a large set of
equilibria–in part because conditional on the future values of monies there
are many pairwise-core outcomes, many ways of dividing the gains from trade
in meetings.2 A subset of them are ones in which the two monies are not
distinguished. We call those uniform-currency equilibria.
We show that a best equilibrium is a uniform-currency equilibrium. We
also show that there are inferior equilibria in which the currencies play dis-
tinct roles. The second result is established by showing that there can be
optimal in that they permit people to credibly signal private information about prefer-
ences concerning the source, by country, of the goods to be consumed. As in [13], [16],
and [18], Kocherlakota and Krueger assume indivisible money, a unit upper bound, and
deterministic trades. They wonder, as do we, whether the signalling function of distinct
monies would survive if money were divisible or if randomization were allowed.
2The same kind of equilibrium concept, described somewhat diﬀerently, is used by
Engineer and Shi [6] to show that there can be a role for money even when there are no
absence-of-double-coincidence diﬃculties.
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discrimination against foreign currency in the sense that the gains from trade
are divided in a way that is more favorable to consumers who have the pro-
ducer’s home currency than to consumers who have the producer’s foreign
currency.
Finally, the existence of inferior equilibria in which currencies are distin-
guished has nothing to do with distinctions between the countries or their
policies; the mere presence of diﬀerent currencies is enough to permit such
inferior equilibria to exist. In the model, the countries are identical, the
money supplies are identical and fixed, and there are no policies. Indeed, the
inferior equilibria in which currencies are distinguished have a fixed exchange
rate. In these equilibria, there are trades of one currency for the other at each
date and the trades are always one for one. Thus, the model gives rise to a
distinction between uniform currency and fixed exchange rates, a distinction
that, as noted by Alvarez [2] and Kehoe [9], is missing in many discussions
of uniform currency.
2 A symmetric two-country environment
Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. There are two identical countries.
There are N > 3 perishable goods at each date and a [0, 1] continuum of each
of N types of people in each country. A type n person consumes only good
n and is at most able to produce good n + 1 (modulo N). Each person
maximizes expected discounted utility with discount parameter β ∈ (0, 1).
The period utility function is u(x)−y, where x is consumption of the relevant
good and y is production of the relevant good. The function u, defined on
R+, is bounded, strictly concave, and increasing, and satisfies u(0) = 0 and
u0(0) =∞. We let g(y) ≡ u(y)− y and let y∗ ≡ argmaxyg(y).
At each date, each person meets someone from his country with proba-
bility θ and meets someone from the other country with probability 1 − θ.
Conditional on the country of residence of the meeting partner, the meeting
partner is a random draw from the population.
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There are two distinct monies in fixed supply. The amount of each is m
per specialization type and per country, where m ∈ (0, 1). In each country,
the fraction m of each specialization type is endowed initially with one unit
of one of the monies. Moreover, at any date, those who begin a period with
money are unable to produce.3 Although people can freely dispose of money,
such disposal does not permit them to produce.
We assume that a person’s specialization type, nationality, and holding of
money are observable. We also assume that people cannot commit to future
actions and that each person’s history, except as revealed by money holdings,
is private.
The assumption that people with money cannot produce, which was also
made in [13], [16], [18], and [11], is critical for our conclusion that a best
equilibrium is a uniform currency equilibrium. With indivisible money and
a unit bound on individual holdings, if people with money can produce, then
having distinct monies can be helpful (see Aiyagari, Wallace, and Wright [1]
and Cavalcanti [5]). Whether or not randomization is allowed, there is an
equilibrium in which the distinction between the monies is ignored and in
which, therefore, a producer with money does not want to trade. However,
there are also equilibria in which one money is more valuable than the other
and in which a producer with the less valuable money is willing to oﬀer it
along with some output to obtain the more valuable money. Because there is
more trade in the second set of equilibria, welfare can be higher with distinct
monies.
This beneficial eﬀect of distinct monies, which is like the benefit of being
able to make change, seems to arise entirely from the assumed indivisibility
of money and the bound on individual holdings. In particular, a plausible
surmise is that it would disappear if money were divisible. Therefore, if we
want to obtain results that are robust to more general individual holdings
3One consequence is that the economy’s total productive capacity is tied to the amount
of money. That being so, we treat the amount of money as a given, not as something to
be chosen by the society.
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and to divisible money, then we should exclude this benefit of distinct monies.
The assumption that people with money are unable to produce accomplishes
that.
The modeling of countries by meeting patterns also merits comment.
Although very diﬀerent from the way countries are defined in international
trade theory, that specification, introduced in [13], seems well-suited for the
study of currency substitution. For obvious reasons, border areas between
countries are the first places to look for currency substitution. As a simple
representation of border areas, consider the following one-dimensional spatial
model. There are K identical “cities” arrayed as K equally spaced points on
a line segment. Residents of each city meet each other more frequently than
they meet residents from adjoining cities and people from non adjoining cities
never meet. If there are two monies, then an obvious question is whether
there are outcomes in which the K cities split into two contiguous sets with
those to one side of an endogenous border specialized in the use of one money
and those to the other side specialized in the use of the other money. The
answer to that question seems to hinge entirely on what can happen in the
two border cities. The specification in [13], which we are adopting, is the
special case in whichK = 2 and in which, therefore, there is only one possible
border. Obviously, that is the first case to study.
3 Symmetric equilibrium
We restrict attention to allocations which are symmetric across countries and
across specialization types. Each person starts a period in one of 3 situations,
which we call states: holds no money, state 0; holds a unit of foreign money,
state 1; holds a unit of home money, state 2. (Thus, if the two people in a
meeting are from diﬀerent countries and if both are in either state 1 or in
state 2, then they are holding distinct monies; if one is in state 1 and the
other is in state 2, then they are holding the same money.)
An allocation describes time paths of the distribution of residents of each
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country over states and actions in meetings. Under the assumed symmetries,
we let pt ≡ (p0t, p1t, p2t), a probability distribution over {0, 1, 2}, be the
beginning of date t distribution over states in each country, where pit is the
fraction of every specialization type in state i at date t and where p0 is the
initial condition. There are meetings in which production can occur, single-
coincidence meetings in which the potential producer does not have money
and in which the potential consumer has money. We call such meetings
production meetings. The only non production meetings that matter are
those between people from diﬀerent countries who hold diﬀerent monies. For
non production meetings, we let sjt be the probability that the monies are
exchanged at date t when both persons start in state j, j = 1, 2, and we
let st = (s1t, s2t).4 For production meetings, we have to distinguish between
those involving two people from the same country and those involving people
from diﬀerent countries. For the former, we let yjt ∈ R+ and τ jt ∈ [0, 1] be
output and the probability that money is transferred at date t when the
consumer is in state j, j = 1, 2.5 For the latter, we let y0jt and τ 0jt denote
the output and the probability that money is transferred at date t when the
consumer is in state j, j = 1, 2. As shorthand, we let yt = (y1t, y2t) and
similarly for τ t, y0t, and τ 0t and let At = (pt, st, yt, τ t, y0t, τ 0t). An allocation is
a sequence {At}∞t=0.
The law of motion for pt can be expressed in terms of the transition matrix
implied by pt, st, τ t, and τ 0t. That is,
pt+1 = ptTt, (1)
4Given the unit bound on money holdings, this description is suﬃcient.
5Although this specification seems restrictive, it is not. Let λ denote a probability
measure over R+ × {0, 1}, where the first set is production and the second is “exchange”
of states, 0 denotes no exchange of states and 1 denotes an exchange of states. Because the
payoﬀs are additively separable in output and the state, only marginal distributions appear
in those payoﬀs. That and the strict convexity of the preferred set for the consumer imply
that equilibrium allocations do not have random output. In addition, only the marginal
distributions for state transitions appear in the transition law for pt.
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where
NTt =


N(1− T12 − T13) p1tθτ 1t + p2t(1-θ)τ
0
2t p2tθτ 2t + p1t(1-θ)τ
0
1t
p0t[θτ 1t + (1-θ)τ
0
1t] N(1− T21 − T23) Np1t(1-θ)s1t
p0t[θτ 2t + (1-θ)τ
0
2t] Np2t(1-θ)s2t N(1− T31 − T32)

 ,
and where Tij denotes the probability of a transition from state i − 1 to
state j − 1. Although it is convenient to define this transition matrix, the
cross-country symmetry implies that for all t, p0t = 1−m and p1t+ p2t = m.
Therefore, (1) can be expressed entirely in terms of a transition for p1t.
In order to define equilibrium allocations, it is convenient to first define
expected discounted utilities. We let vit denote the expected discounted
utility at the start of a date, prior to meetings, of someone in state i and let
vt ≡ (v0t, v1t, v2t)0. Then, the sequence {vt} satisfies
vt = Rt + βTtvt+1, (2)
where
Rt =
1
N


−
P2
j=1 pjt[θyjt + (1− θ)y
0
jt]
p0t[θu(y1t) + (1− θ)u(y
0
1t)
p0t[θu(y2t) + (1− θ)u(y
0
2t)

 .
For future reference, we note that given an allocation, there is exactly one
bounded sequence {vt} that satisfies (2).6
Now we define equilibrium allocations.
Definition 1 Given an initial condition p0, an allocation {At}∞t=0 is an equi-
librium if (1) holds and if there exists a bounded sequence {vt} satisfying (2)
such that the trade components of At are individually rational and pairwise
eﬃcient (are in the pairwise core) given vt+1.
We next define what we mean by a uniform-currency equilibrium. In a
uniform-currency equilibrium, people do not distinguish between home and
foreign money, between states 1 and 2.
6Consider the space of bounded sequences, {vt}, with the sup norm. Let the mapping
f = (f0, f1, ...., ft, ...) from this space into itself be defined by ft({vt}) = Rt + βTtvt+1.
Then, f satisfies Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions for contraction.
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Definition 2 A uniform-currency equilibrium is an equilibrium that satisfies
y1t = y2t, and τ 1t = τ 2t and y01t = y02t, and τ 01t = τ 02t.
It follows from (2) and the definition of the transition matrix Tt that
v1t = v2t for a uniform currency equilibrium. It also follows that the vt se-
quence implied by a uniform-currency equilibrium does not depend on those
for st and pt. In other words, a uniform-currency equilibrium is a one-money
equilibrium which makes trades of the two monies and the distribution be-
tween the two monies in each country irrelevant.
Our welfare criterion is ex ante expected utility prior to the assignment
of money holdings to individuals; namely, the inner product p0v0 ≡ w. It
follows from (2) that
ptvt = ptRt + βptTtvt+1 = ptRt + βpt+1vt+1.
Therefore,
w =
∞X
t=0
βtptRt =
∞X
t=0
βt{p0tN
2X
j=1
pjt[θg(yjt) + (1− θ)g(y0jt)]} (3)
where, recall, g(x) ≡ u(x)− x.
4 Best equilibria
We describe best equilibria in each of two mutually exclusive and exhaustive
regions of the parameter space, regions which can be thought of as the low
β region and the high β region. For low β, we show that best equilibria are
uniform-currency equilibria. For high β, we show that there exist uniform-
currency equilibria which are best equilibria.
In each case, we propose an equilibrium. Let γ ≡ β(1−m)N(1−β) and let xˆ(γ) de-
note the unique positive solution for x to x = γg(x).7 Existence and unique-
ness of xˆ(γ) follow from the properties of g. Another consequence of those
7It is well-known (see, for example, [4]) that xˆ(γ) is the largest constant output that
satisfies individual rationality for producers for a one-country, one-money version of our
model.
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properties, used below, is that if x ≤ γg(x), then x ≤ xˆ(γ). We show that
any best equilibrium has output equal to min{xˆ(γ), y∗} in every production
meeting. Moreover, for low β–more precisely, for xˆ(γ) ≤ y∗–this best out-
come for output is attained only by uniform-currency equilibria. For high
β (xˆ(γ) > y∗), it is attained by many equilibria, among which are uniform-
currency equilibria. The low β case might be regarded as especially relevant
because in that case (when it holds with strict inequality) paying interest on
money would be desirable if it were feasible.
Proposition 1 Let γ ≡ β(1−m)N(1−β) and let xˆ(γ) denote the unique positive so-
lution for x to x = γg(x). If xˆ(γ) ≤ y∗, then best equilibria satisfy yjt =
y0jt = xˆ(γ) and τ jt = τ 0jt = 1, and, therefore, are uniform-currency equilib-
ria. If xˆ(γ) > y∗, then there exist uniform-currency equilibria which are best
equilibria.
The proof is given in section 6. The main part of the proof involves show-
ing for the case xˆ(γ) ≤ y∗ that there is no better equilibrium.
The result for the case xˆ(γ) > y∗ cannot be strengthened. If xˆ(γ) > y∗,
then there are non uniform-currency equilibria that are best equilibria. For
example, for θ close to unity, an equilibrium with output equal to y∗ in
every production meeting, with τ 1t = τ 02t = 1 and τ 2t = τ 01t = 1 − ε for
some positive and small ε is a best equilibrium for some initial condition
and implies v2t > v1t > v0t. This kind of example also implies that if we
distinguish people by initial asset holding, then it is not true that any non
uniform-currency equilibrium is Pareto dominated by some uniform-currency
equilibrium.8
8The individual diﬀerences in initial asset holdings in this model are dictated by the
restrictive assumptions about individual money holdings: the indivisibility of money and
the unit upper bound. In a version without such restrictive assumptions, individuals could
be assumed to have identical initial asset holdings.
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5 Inferior equilibria
For the case xˆ(γ) ≤ y∗ we now show that there exist equilibria in which
the monies play distinct roles and, in particular, are such that observed
prices, as implied by the trades that occur, are higher in foreign currency
than in home currency. This demonstration serves two purposes. First, it
shows that proposition 1 is not vacuous in the sense that there do exist non
uniform-currency equilibria. Second, and more important, the existence of
such equilibria is our explanation for the distinct roles of diﬀerent monies
that we often see.9
An obvious way to get such a diﬀerential price equilibrium is to have
the gains from trade in meetings divided up in diﬀerent ways depending on
whether or not the consumer can oﬀer the producer the producer’s home
money. This is our way of modeling the idea of getting a relatively bad
deal with foreign money. With one money, it is known that maximizing the
value of money corresponds to having the consumer make take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀers and that a valued money steady state does not exist if the producer
makes take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers. The former gives all the gains from trade in
meetings to the consumer, while the latter gives them all to the producer.
In the proof of the next proposition, if a potential consumer can oﬀer state
2 to the producer, then the consumer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer; while
if a potential consumer can oﬀer state 1 to the producer, then the producer
makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer.
To set the stage for the proof, we describe the date t solutions to these
special bargaining problems for any vt+1 that satisfies the inequalities, v0t+1 <
v1t+1 ≤ v2t+1 ≤ y
∗
β , the last of which is implied by xˆ(γ) ≤ y
∗. To simplify the
notation here, we suppress time subscripts.
Lemma 1 Let ∆i ≡ vi − v0 for i = 1, 2. If the consumer can oﬀer the
9There are many models which use government policies that penalize holdings of foreign
money or favor holdings of home money to get distinct roles for home and foreign money.
See, for example, Li and Wright [12] and Waller and Soller Curtis [17].
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producer the producer’s home money, if the consumer makes a take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀer, and if 0 < ∆1 ≤ ∆2 ≤ y
∗
β , then y2 = y
0
1 = β∆2 and τ 2 = τ 01 = 1.
Proof. Here the producer’s individual rationality (IR) constraint must hold
at equality. Substituting from that constraint into the consumer’s objective,
we get u(y)− y∆i∆2 , where i is the consumer’s state. Let x = argmax[u(y)−
y∆i∆2 ]. It follows from ∆i ≤ ∆2 that x ≥ y
∗ ≥ β∆2. Therefore x violates IR
for the producer, which implies that y = β∆2 and τ = 1 is the only candidate
solution. Because this candidate satisfies consumer IR, it is the solution.
Lemma 2 Let ∆i ≡ vi − v0 for i = 1, 2. If the consumer can oﬀer the
producer the producer’s foreign money, if the producer makes a take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀer, and if 0 < ∆1 ≤ ∆2 ≤ y
∗
β , then y1 = u
−1(β∆1), τ 1 = 1, y02 =
min{η(∆2∆1 ), u−1(β∆2)}, and τ 02 =
u(y02)
β∆2 > 0, where η(
∆2
∆1 ) ≡ argmaxy[
∆1
∆2u(y)−
y].
Proof. Here the consumer’s IR constraint must hold at equality. Let i be the
consumer’s state. If∆i = ∆1 and if, for the moment, we ignore the constraint
τ ≤ 1, then the problem is to maximize g(y). But because the maximizer
of g is y∗, and u(y∗) > y∗ ≥ β∆1, output at y∗ violates the consumer’s
IR constraint at equality. Therefore, the unique candidate solution is y =
u−1(β∆1) and τ = 1. This is the solution because it satisfies producer IR .
Now suppose ∆i > ∆1, which implies that ∆i = ∆2. Substituting from the
consumer’s IR constraint into the objective, the objective becomes ∆1∆2u(y)−
y. It follows that the only candidate solution is y = min{η(∆2∆1 ), u−1(β∆2)}
with τ determined by the consumer’s IR constraint at equality. Because
producer IR is satisfied at this candidate, it is the solution.
The trades described in lemmas 1 and 2 are functions of ∆ ≡ (∆1,∆2)
and are continuous in ∆. Those properties are used in the proof of the next
proposition.
Proposition 2 If θ > 1
2
and xˆ(γ) ≤ y∗, then for any p0 there exists an
equilibrium with v0t < v1t < v2t, st ≡ (s1t, s2t) = (1, 0), and p1,t+1 ∈ (0,m).
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The proof appears in section 6. It applies the sequence of truncated
economies approach used in Balasko and Shell [3] and Brouwer’s fixed point
theorem for each truncated economy.
Corollary 1 In a proposition 2 equilibrium consistent with the bargaining
schemes of lemmas 1 and 2, prices at each date in terms of foreign currency
exceed prices in terms of home currency.
Proof. According to the model, observed prices in home currency are τ2ty2t
and
τ 01t
y01t
, while observed prices in foreign currency are τ1ty1t and
τ 02t
y02t
. By lemma
1, prices in home currency satisfy τ1ty1t =
τ 02t
y02t
= 1β∆2t+1 . By lemma 2 and
proposition 2, prices in terms of foreign currency satisfy: τ1ty1t =
1
u−1(β∆1t+1) >
1
(β∆1t+1) >
1
β∆2t+1 and
τ 02t
y02t
=
u(y02t)/β∆2t+1
y02t
> 1β∆2t+1 .
A proposition 2 equilibrium has some foreign trade. In fact, some for-
eign trade occurs whenever an allocation gives rise to v1t > v0t, a higher
value of holding foreign currency than of producing. When that inequality
holds, any pairwise core outcome has trade in a meeting between a producer
and a consumer who can oﬀer the producer state 1, the producer’s foreign
money. Moreover, because v1t > 0 is a consequence of v2t > 0 (by way of
meetings with foreigners), a necessary condition for valuable home money
and no foreign trade is v0t ≥ v1t > 0. Although there exist such equilibria for
some initial conditions and some parameters, we do not think they should
be taken seriously.10 In a model with divisible money in which anyone can
always produce, the analogue of the inequality v0t ≥ v1t cannot hold. (In our
model, even v0t > v1t is possible because disposing of money does not give a
person the capability to produce.)
10To construct such allocations, set p1t = y02t = τ 02t = y1t = τ1t = 0 and choose scalars
y2t ≡ y2 and τ2t ≡ τ2 so that v2t ≡ v2 > v0t ≡ v0 > 0. There are many such (y2, τ2).
(Any stationary one-money, one-country monetary allocation for a model in which people
meet no one with probability 1− θ will do except those consistent with take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀers by consumers.) For such allocations, the only meetings that contribute to making
v1t ≡ v1 positive are meetings with foreign producers. It follows that the implied v1 → 0
as θ→ 1. Therefore, for θ near enough to unity, such allocations exist.
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6 Proofs of the propositions
This section contains the proofs of propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 1. Let γ = β(1−m)N(1−β) and let xˆ(γ) denote the unique positive
solution for x to x = γg(x). If xˆ(γ) ≤ y∗, then best equilibria satisfy yjt =
y0jt = xˆ(γ) and τ jt = τ 0jt = 1, and, therefore, are uniform-currency equilibria.
If xˆ(γ) > y∗, then there exist uniform-currency equilibria which are best
equilibria.
Proof. Assume that xˆ(γ) ≤ y∗.
First we show that there exists {pt+1, st} such that it and yjt = y0jt = xˆ(γ)
and τ jt = τ 0jt = 1 is an equilibrium. There exist many such {pt+1, st}. We
can let {st} be arbitrary and then let {pt+1} be determined by (1 ). For {vt},
we propose v0t = 0 and v1t = v2t = xˆ(γ)β . Direct substitution shows that these
satisfy (2). The final step is to show that yjt = y0jt = xˆ(γ), τ jt = τ 0jt = 1,
and any st is in the pairwise core when v0t = 0 and v1t = v2t = xˆ(γ)β . With
v1t+1 = v2t+1, any st is in the pairwise core. As regards yjt = y0jt = xˆ(γ),
τ jt = τ 0jt = 1, it is suﬃcient to show that these solve the following problem:
choose scalars y ≥ 0 and τ ∈ [0, 1] to maximize u(y) + τ · 0+ (1 − τ )xˆ(γ)−
xˆ(γ) = u(y)− τ xˆ(γ) subject to −y + (1− τ ) · 0 + τ xˆ(γ) = −y + τ xˆ(γ) ≥ 0.
The solution is y = min{xˆ(γ), y∗} with the constraint at equality. The
assumption, xˆ(γ) ≤ y∗, implies that the solution is y = xˆ(γ) and τ = 1.
Let w∗ denote ex ante welfare implied by yjt = y0jt = xˆ(γ) according
to (3). Now we turn to the main part of the proof and show that any
equilibrium which gives welfare no smaller than w∗ also has yjt = y0jt = xˆ(γ)
and τ jt = τ 0jt = 1. Let A denote an equilibrium which gives welfare no
smaller than w∗. If A does not satisfy yjt = y0jt = xˆ(γ) and τ jt = τ 0jt = 1,
then A must diﬀer either in some y component or some τ component at some
date. If the former, then some y component at some date must exceed xˆ(γ)
(Otherwise, w(A) < w∗ because g is increasing on [0, y∗]). By producer IR,
it follows that ∆jt(A) > xˆ(γ)β for some t and j. (Recall that ∆jt = vjt − v0t =
xˆ(γ)
β and τ jt = τ 0jt = 1 for the candidate uniform-currency equilibrium.) If
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not the former–and, therefore, only the latter–then, again by producer IR,
∆jt(A) > xˆ(γ)β for some t and j. We show that the condition ∆jt(A) >
xˆ(γ)
β
gives rise to a contradiction. Let ∆Mt(A) = max{∆1t(A),∆2t(A)}. We first
show that ∆jt(A) > xˆ(γ)β implies that {∆Mt+k(A)}∞k=0 is strictly increasing.
Claim: If ∆Mt(A) > xˆ(γ)β , then ∆Mt+1(A) > ∆Mt(A).
To simplify the expressions, we omit the argument A in what follows. It
is to be understood, that the allocation and the sequence {vt} pertain to A.
By (2), for j = 1, 2,
∆jt = β∆jt+1 +
θ
N {p0t[u(yjt)− τ jtβ∆jt+1] +
2X
i=1
pit(yit − τ itβ∆it+1)}+
(1− θ)
N {p0t[u(y
0
jt)− τ 0jtβ∆jt+1] +
2X
i=1
pit(y0it − τ 0itβ∆i0t+1)}+
(1− θ)sjtpjtβ(∆j0t+1 −∆jt+1) (4)
This expresses vjt − v0t as the discounted value of itself plus the gains from
trade of starting in state j minus the gains from starting in state 0. By
producer IR and the definition of ∆Mt+1, it follows that
∆jt ≤ β∆Mt+1 +
p0t
N {θ[u(yjt)− τ jtβ∆jt+1] + (1− θ)[u(y
0
jt)− τ 0jtβ∆jt+1]}.
Using producer IR again and the definition of g, we have
∆jt ≤ β∆Mt+1 +
p0t
N [θg(τ jtβ∆jt+1) + (1− θ)g(τ
0
jtβ∆jt+1)].
Then, by concavity of g,
∆jt ≤ β∆Mt+1 +
p0t
N g(τβ∆jt+1), (5)
where τ ≡ θτ jt+(1− θ)τ 0jt. Because (5) holds for j = 1, 2, it follows that for
some j,
∆Mt ≤ β∆Mt+1 +
p0t
N g(τβ∆jt+1). (6)
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Now suppose by contradiction that ∆Mt+1 ≤ ∆Mt. Then for some j, we
have
∆Mt ≤ β∆Mt +
p0t
N g(τβ∆jt+1)
or
∆Mt ≤
p0t
(1− β)N g(τβ∆jt+1) (7)
or multiplying by β and using p0t = 1−m,
β∆Mt ≤ γg(τβ∆jt+1). (8)
Now we deal separately with β∆Mt ≤ y∗ and β∆Mt > y∗. If β∆Mt ≤ y∗,
then τβ∆jt+1 ≤ β∆Mt+1 ≤ β∆Mt. ≤ y∗, which implies that g(τβ∆jt+1) ≤
g(β∆Mt). This and (8) imply β∆Mt ≤ γg(β∆Mt). But by the definition of
xˆ(γ), this inequality contradicts the hypothesis of the claim. If β∆Mt > y∗,
then (8) implies y∗ < γg(y∗). This inequality contradicts the definition of
xˆ(γ) and the assumption xˆ(γ) ≤ y∗. Hence, the claim is established.
Because {∆Mt+k(A)}∞k=0 is strictly increasing and bounded, it has a limit,
L, where βL > xˆ(γ). As demonstrated above, (6) is a consequence of the
assumption about allocation A. The limit conclusion and (6) imply that
L− ε ≤ βL+ p0tN g(τβ∆jt+1) (9)
or
βL− βε
1− β ≤ γg(τβ∆jt+1) (10)
for any arbitrarily small ε > 0 and τβ∆jt+1 < βL. But (10) produces the
same kind of contradiction obtained at the end of the proof of the claim. If
βL ≤ y∗, then (10) implies βL− βε
1−β ≤ γg(βL), which contradicts βL > xˆ(γ).
If βL > y∗, then (10) implies y∗− βε
1−β < γg(y∗), which contradicts xˆ(γ) ≤ y∗.
This completes the case, xˆ(γ) ≤ y∗.
Now suppose xˆ(γ) > y∗.
In this case, there are many uniform currency best equilibria. All satisfy
yjt = y0jt = y∗. To find all possible uniform probabilities of transferring
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money, we begin by using the stationary version of (4). If yjt = y0jt = y∗ and
τ jt = τ 0jt = τ > 0, then the stationary version of (4) implies
τβ∆[1 + N(1− β)βτ ] = (1−m)u(y
∗) +my∗. (11)
If we set τβ∆ = y∗, as implied by binding producer IR, then (11) implies
τ = y∗γg(y∗) < 1, where the inequality follows from xˆ(γ) > y∗. Now consider
yjt = y0jt = y∗ and τ jt = τ 0jt = τ ∗ ∈ [ y
∗
γg(y∗) .1]. As above, let {st} be arbitrary
and let {pt+1} be determined by (1 ). We have only to show that any such
allocation is an equilibrium. (Because y∗ is the unconstrained maximum of
g, there is no better allocation.)
Let ∆∗ be the solution for ∆ from (11) when τ = τ ∗. We have only to
show that (y∗, τ ∗) is in the pairwise core when ∆ = ∆∗. That is, it is enough
to show that (y, τ) = (y∗, τ ∗) satisfies consumer IR and is the solution to the
following problem for some k ≥ 0 : choose (y, τ) to maximize u(y) − τβ∆∗
subject to −y + τβ∆∗ ≥ k. It is evident that (y, τ) = (y∗, τ ∗) is the solution
if k = −y∗ + τ ∗β∆∗. Thus, we need to confirm that −y∗ + τ ∗β∆∗ ≥ 0. By
construction, −y∗+ τ ∗β∆∗ = 0 when τ ∗ = y∗γg(y∗) . By (11), τβ∆ is increasing
in τ . Therefore, −y∗ + τ ∗β∆∗ ≥ 0 for all τ ∗ ∈ [ y∗γg(y∗) , 1]. Finally, satisfaction
of consumer IR (u(y∗) ≥ τ ∗β∆∗) follows from (11) and u(y∗) > y∗.
Proposition 2. If θ > 1
2
and xˆ(γ) ≤ y∗, then for any p0 there exists an
equilibrium with v0t < v1t < v2t, st ≡ (s1t, s2t) = (1, 0), and p1,t+1 ∈ (0, m).
Proof. We use the truncated economy approach in [3]. The first step involves
applying Brouwer’s fixed point theorem to establish existence for a T -period
economy conditional on a given terminal condition for ∆ = (∆1,∆2).
We begin by defining a (one-period) mapping, H. In eﬀect, the mapping
is from ∆t+1 = (∆1t+1,∆2t+1) and pt to ∆t and pt+1 via (1) and (2) using the
trades implied by lemmas 1 and 2 and st ≡ (s1t, s2t) = (1, 0). To simplify the
notation, we drop time subscripts when it will not cause confusion.
For j = 1, 2, let hj(∆, p1) denote the right-hand side of (4) and let
h3(∆, p1) be the second component of ptTt (see (1)) when pt = (1 − m,
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p1, m− p1), and when (yt, y0t, τ t, τ 0t) is given by the conclusions of lemmas 1
and 2 and st = (1, 0). Then, let H(∆, p1) ≡ (h1(∆, p1), h2(∆, p1), h3(∆, p1)).
Our next task is to choose a suitable domain for H. We begin by con-
structing lower bounds for h1 and h2 for ∆ satisfying 0 < ∆1 ≤ ∆2 ≤ y
∗
β . By
definition,
h1(∆, p1) = β∆1 +
θp1
N (y1 − τ 1β∆1) +
(1− θ)p0
N [u(y
0
1)− τ 01β∆1]
+
(1− θ)
N {p2(y
0
2 − τ 02β∆1) + p1Nβ(∆2 −∆1)}. (12)
Therefore, using ∆2 ≥ ∆1 ≥ 0 and gathering all the terms in ∆1, we have
h1(∆, p1) ≥ β∆1[1−
1
N ] +
(1− θ)p0
N [u(y
0
1)] ≥
(1− θ)p0
N [u(y
0
1)]. (13)
Moreover, by lemma 1, y01 = β∆2. Therefore,
h1(∆, p1) ≥
(1− θ)(1−m)
N [u(β∆2)]. (14)
Thus, a positive lower bound on ∆2 implies a positive lower bound on
h1(∆, p1).
Now we turn to h2(∆, p1). By definition,
h2(∆, p1) = β∆2 +
θ
N p0[u(y2)− τ 2β∆2] +
θ
N p1(y1 − τ 1β∆1)
+
(1− θ)
N p2(y
0
2 − τ 02β∆1). (15)
Therefore, using ∆2 ≥ ∆1 ≥ 0 and gathering all the terms in ∆2, we have
h2(∆, p1) ≥ β∆2(1−
1
N ) +
θp0
N u(y2) ≥
θp0
N u(y2). (16)
Because y2 = β∆2 by lemma 1,
h2(∆, p1) ≥
θ(1−m)
N u(β∆2). (17)
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Now let bˆ be the unique positive solution to b = θ(1−m)N u(βb) and let e ∈ (0, bˆ).
It follows that if ∆2 ≥ e, then h2(∆, p1) ≥ e.
We use this lower bound and that in (14) to construct the domain for
H. Let (ε1, ε2) satisfy the following three conditions: ε2 ∈ (0, bˆ), ε1 =
(1−θ)(1−m)
N u(βε2), and max(ε1, ε2) <
xˆ(γ)
β . (Because u(0) = 0, these conditions
can always be met.) Let
S ≡ {∆ ∈ R2 : ∆i ∈ [εi, xˆ(γ)β ] and ∆1 ≤ ∆2} and D ≡ S × [0, m]. (18)
Our proposed domain for H is D. Notice that D is nonempty, compact, and
convex.
The next task is to show that H(D) ⊂ D. For any z ∈ D, it is immediate
that h3(z) ∈ [0, m]. Also, z ∈ D implies that the restrictions on ∆ assumed
in lemmas 1 and 2 hold. Therefore, by construction, the lower bounds in S
are preserved by the mapping H.
It remains to show that if z ∈ D, then h1(z) ≤ h2(z) ≤ xˆ(γ)β . We start
with the first inequality. From (12) and (15),
h2(z)− h1(z) = β(∆2 −∆1)[1− (1− θ)p1] +
θp0
N [u(y2)− τ 2β∆2]−
(1− θ)p0
N [u(y
0
1)− τ 01β∆1].
By lemma 2, (y2, τ 2) = (y01, τ 01) = (β∆2, 1). Therefore,
h2(z)− h1(z) = β(∆2 −∆1)[1− (1− θ)p1] +
θp0
N [g(β∆2)]−
(1− θ)p0
N [g(β∆2)− β(∆2 −∆1)]
= β(∆2 −∆1)λ +
p0g(β∆2)
N (2θ − 1) > 0, (19)
where λ ≡ [1− (1−θ)p0(1+ 1N )] > 0 because θ >
1
2
. Therefore, θ > 1
2
implies
the strict inequality in (19). We now show that z ∈ D implies h2(z) ≤ xˆ(γ)β .
19
Only the first two terms on the right side of (15) can be positive. Therefore,
h2(z) ≤ β∆2 +
θ(1−m)
N [g(β∆2)] = β∆2 +
1− β
β γ[g(β∆2)]
≤ xˆ(γ) + 1− ββ γg(xˆ(γ)) = xˆ(γ) +
1− β
β xˆ(γ) =
xˆ(γ)
β
where the last inequality uses the hypothesis xˆ(γ) ≤ y∗ to conclude that
β∆2 ≤ xˆ(γ) implies g(β∆2) ≤ g(xˆ(γ).
Now we turn to the truncated economy. Let T ≥ 1. Fix (∆T , p10) ∈ D
and let zT ≡ (z0, z1, ..., zT−1), where zt = (∆1t,∆2t, p1,t+1) ∈ D. Notice that
zT ∈ DT . Let HT (·;∆T , p10) ≡ (H0,H1, ...,HT−1) : DT → DT be defined by
Ht(zT ;∆T , p10) ≡ H(∆t+1, p1t). The conclusion that HT maps DT into itself
follows from the fact, that H maps D into itself. Because H is a continuous
function on D, it follows that HT : DT → DT is a continuous function
on a non-empty, compact, and convex domain. Therefore, by Brouwer’s
fixed point theorem, HT has a fixed point. Any such fixed point satisfies
the equilibrium conditions for dates t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1 given the terminal
condition ∆T .
Now let
F T (p10) = {zT ∈ DT : HT (zT ;∆T , p10) = zT for some ∆T ∈ S}. (20)
That is, F T is the set of fixed points of HT–as the terminal condition, ∆T ,
ranges over all of S. By definition, F T (p10) ⊂ DT . Now let Ω0 ≡ ×∞0 D,
Ω1 ≡ F 1 × (×∞1 D), ...,ΩT ≡ F T × (×∞T D), ..... It follows that Ω0 ⊃ Ω1 ⊃
... ⊃ ΩT ⊃ ..., so that the sequence {Ωt}∞t=0 is a sequence of non-empty,
compact, nested sets. It follows from Tychonoﬀ’s Theorem that Ω ≡ ∩∞t=0Ωt
is not empty. Let z˜ denote an element of Ω. We can associate with z˜ the
sequence of trades implied by lemmas 1 and 2. Finally, we can associate with
those trades a sequence {vt}∞t=0 implied by (2 ); namely,
vt = Rt +
∞X
i=t+1
βi−t(Πi−1j=tTj)Ri. (21)
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Because Tj is a transition matrix and Ri as determined by z˜ is bounded,
vt exists. Finally, any such {vt}∞t=0 is consistent with z˜. Hence, there is an
equilibrium associated with z˜. Call it {A˜t}∞t=0. The last step is to verify the
strict inequalities not guaranteed by the domain D.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that {A˜t}∞t=0 implies v1t = v2t. By the
definition of D, v1t+1 ≤ v2t+1. But since vt+1 and vt have to be consistent
with the mapping H, this violates the inequality in (19). Next, consider the
claim that p˜t+1 has full support. If p˜t has full support, then so does p˜t+1
because not everyone trades. If p˜t does not have full support, then p˜t+1 does
because, according to lemmas 1 and 2, there is a positive inflow into the other
state through trade with foreigners. In fact, this shows that the p˜t sequence
cannot converge to a non full-support distribution.
7 Concluding remarks
According to our model, the benefit of a uniform currency is that it avoids
a class of equilibria in which the diﬀerent currencies play distinct roles, a
class which is superfluous but not innocuous. The class is superfluous in the
sense that the optimum is always among the equilibria in which the monies
do not play distinct roles. The class is not innocuous because, as proposition
2 shows, it contains inferior equilibria.11 Although we demonstrated this for
a very particular model, a divisible goods version of [13] with randomized
trade, the results seem to depend on only two ingredients of the model. One
is that trade occurs in single-coincidence meetings in which the gains-from-
trade associated with trading goods for money are such that the pairwise
core contains many elements. The other is that the sole requirement for
equilibrium is that trades be in that core. (In fact, small groups could replace
11The existence of inferior equilibira distinguishes our multiplicity from that in the
exchange-rate indeterminacy literature (see Kareken and Wallace [8] , Manuelli and Peck
[14], and King, Wallace, and Weber [10]). Unless the models in that literature are aug-
mented by assumptions which rule out risk-sharing markets, the multiplicity is innocuous;
multi-currency outcomes are no worse than one-currency outcomes.
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pairs without substantially changing the results.12)
Those two ingredients give rise to a multiplicity of equilibria that many
readers will find troublesome. In the model, in the low discount factor case,
any best equilibrium has unique trades: each unit of money trades for a
particular of amount of the good. Such trades are consistent with take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀers by consumers, but are not implied by those oﬀers. (Even with
such oﬀers, no trade of any sort is a possible equilibrium, and in richer settings
there are other possible equilibria.) Because the best trades are inconsistent
with any other way of dividing the gains from trade in meetings, inferior
equilibria are easy to construct. One way is to make the division depend
on which money is oﬀered, proposition 2 being one extreme instance. Of
course, there are also inferior uniform-currency equilibria–for example, an
equilibrium with no trade at all or equilibria in which trades depend on the
nationalities of consumers and producers.
Despite the implied multiplicity, the two main ingredients should not be
quickly dismissed. The notion that trade occurs in pairs has been part of
discussions of money for a very long time and not because anyone thought
that it led to a simple and tractable model. And if trade occurs in pairs
against the background of a large economy, then the pairwise core is an
appealing concept of equilibrium. In a world in which those two ingredients
are approximately valid, it could easily happen that countries end up with
distinct roles for home and foreign monies. That is the kind of world in which
the benefit of a uniform currency set out above applies.
However, the result that the best equilibrium is a uniform-currency equi-
librium may not hold if countries diﬀer—for example, in preferences. If coun-
tries diﬀer, then having diﬀerent distributions of money within each coun-
try may be desirable because the distributions aﬀect individual-rationality
constraints. And the set of equilibrium distributions is likely to be larger
with distinct currencies than with a uniform currency. Therefore, diﬀerences
12But centralized markets would change the results because the core would contain only
one allocation.
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among countries could overturn the result that the best equilibrium is a
uniform-currency equilibrium.
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